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ABSTRACT
Using centralised data storage systems has been the standard prac-
tice followed by online service providers when managing the per-
sonal data of their users. This method requires users to trust these
providers and, to some extent, users are not in full control over
their data. The development of applications around decentralised
data vaults, i.e., encrypted storage systems located in user-managed
devices, can give this control back to the users as sole owners of the
data. However, the development of such applications is not efort-
free, and it requires developers to have specialised knowledge, such
as how to deploy secure and peer-to-peer communication systems.
We present Vaultage, a model-based framework that can simplify
the development of data vault applications. We demonstrate its
core features through a social network application case study and
include some initial evaluation results, showing Vaultage’s code
generation capabilities and some proiling analysis of the generated
network components.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Themajority of online software-based service providers manage the
data of their users in a centralised manner. This practise requires
users to transfer control of their personal data to their service
providers by uploading it to remote servers. This control trans-
fer is almost always an unavoidable step when users want to use
any of the provided services (e.g. email, social networks, search
engines), and it may come with consequences: it limits users’ self-
management of their data, and this data could be used irresponsibly
(i.e. third parties using data without its owners’ consents).
℧ost service providers use Terms of Service (ToS) to deine
how users’ data will be employed and protected, and it is up to
the inal users to accept the terms. Unfortunately, most of these
ToSs are expressed in a language that is complex and tedious to
understand [9], and are presented in ways that might direct users
to ignore the terms and immediately jump to use the provided
services [17].
In order to bring back control of personal data to users, the Eu-
ropean Union has issued the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) ± a set of rules regarding the processing, movement, and
protection of personal data [18]. The regulation sets up some rights
to users that providers should ensure when delivering their ser-
vices. These include, among others, the right to be informed of
the processing that users data might receive; the right to object to
certain data processes (e.g. personalised marketing); or the right to
be forgotten (erasure of any user data). While the GDPR is a great
improvement on how user data must be managed, users still need
to trust their service providers would comply with the GDPR rules
along with any other applied regulation.
This situation could be improved by including the requirement
of users having full control of their data in the design phase of an
application development. A potential design to support this require-
ment involves storing users data into their personal devices instead
of handing data over to service providers. These user-managed
storage systems can be denoted as personal or decentralised data
vaults [10]. Following such a design, data is always under user
control, and any external entity requesting access to a data vault
can be granted so directly by the vault owner, i.e., the inal user.
In this paper, we present Vaultage, a model-based framework
that can simplify the development of applications based on decen-
tralised data vaults. Vaultage allows modeling both the data to be
stored in a data vault, and the valid requests that a vault might
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receive. From a model containing this information, Vaultage gen-
erates a set of Java classes for the internal usage of the available
data, and a secure communication infrastructure that can be used
to interchange the speciied requests and responses between the
data vaults of a speciic application.
We have tested Vaultage code generation capabilities by creating
diferent data vault-based applications. Also, we have started a set of
performance evaluation tests oriented to measure the performance
of the diferent components of the generated architecture.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the decentralised data vaults used in Vaultage. Section 3 introduces
the running example that is used to explain the architecture and
main features of Vaultage in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our
evaluation eforts to assess Vaultage. Finally, Section 6 comments
on related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines
future work.
2 DECENTRALISED DATA VAULTS
A decentralised data vault1 aims to store personal data in user-
managed devices, thus giving these users more control over their
data [10]. This is in contrast with common online services (e.g.
cloud storages, social networks, search engines, etc.) manner of
working, where users are required to trust the management of their
personal data to a third party under often shady terms of service [9].
The data vaults promoted in this paper are composed of the
following parts:
(1) Data schema. Our vaults have a predeined schema of the
data they may store, which depends on the application do-
main. For instance, a medical app might store data about
patients and their treatments. All data vaults of the same
type share the same schema.
(2) Data request operations. Data vaults might receive exter-
nal requests to access certain data contained in them, and
then it is the responsibility of the vault owners⁄managers to
appropriately respond to these requests, or to reject them.
The explicit set of possible request operations that a concrete
data vault type can expect has to be established. This set of
request operations is similar to the REST API provided by a
web service [12].
Therefore, any application wishing to include data vaults into
its architecture must start by deining the two properties described
above. While this inclusion can improve the privacy, security and
users’ control over any personal data used by the application [6, 7,
10], it does not come without challenges:
(1) Disruption on domain⁄business and analytical processes
since data might not always be available (i.e. users can turn
of their devices anytime or revoke permissions).
(2) Performance might be reduced since data are stored in per-
sonal devices which are generally less powerful than dedi-
cated servers.
(3) The veracity of certain data items might need to be validated
by requests external to any user-managed data vault, e.g.,
the reputation of a user in a second-hand online market, or
simply the number of likes of a post in a social network.
1For simplicity, in the remaining of the paper we just refer to data vaults.
(4) In terms of application development, the deinition of a data
vault must be followed by the implementation of an infras-
tructure to persist the deined data schema, and to enable
communications to receive and respond to the set of possible
requests. The fact that data is stored in a decentralised way
can make network coniguration more complex (e.g. routing
or irewall aspects), and asynchronous⁄parallel processing of
requests and responses is required (synchronisation, locking,
racing, and timing problems).
This paper focuses on the last challenge, related to properly
implementing an infrastructure to integrate data vaults into an ap-
plication. This challenge is orthogonal to any application using data
vaults, which creates an opportunity for code reuse and automatic
generation. Starting from a data vault deinition, the objective of the
Vaultage framework is to automatically generate a set of software
artefacts responsible for representing the data that can be stored in
the vault (useful for the internal management of this data), and a
communication network suitable for securely sending requests to
and receiving responses from data vaults.
We use a running example throughout the paper to show how
Vaultage supports developers during the integration of data vaults
into an application. This example is presented in the next section.
3 RUNNING EXAMPLE: FAIRNET
A social network is a platform where users can create relationships
between them based on their shared interests or opinions. In a
very basic form, a social network allows users to create an online
proile; link with other users by establishing friend or follower
connections; and share information such as text posts, images, or
videos. In traditional, centrally-managed systems, all data of such
a social network would be stored in the service provider systems.
Along this paper, we describe how to deine Fairnet, a data vault-
based social network application where data is owned by the social
network users.
In Fairnet, each user would be the owner of a data vault, and
would communicate with other users by sending requests to their
respective vaults. We describe next the requirements of Fairnet: the
data schema and the available requests that can be sent to a Fairnet
vault.
3.1 Data Schema
A Fairnet data vault stores the following information of its user:
• As proile information, only the name of the user is stored.
(RA1)
• A list of created posts. A post is composed of an id, a title, a
text content, and a timestamp. Also, a post can be marked
as public, which is a boolean value checked when receiving
requests. (RA2)
• A list of accepted friends. We store the name of each friend.
(RA3)
3.2 Data Vault Requests
There are three diferent requests that can be sent to a Fairnet vault:
• addFriend: send a friend request to another another Fairnet
vault (i.e. to another user). This request includes information
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to identify the requester, and can be answered with a positive
or negative response. (RB1)
• getPosts: ask for the list of post titles of a user. The title of a
post is considered public in Fairnet, so this request is usually
properly responded by the receiver. (RB2)
• getPost: ask for the data of a concrete post owned by the
user. This user would send the requested data if the post is
marked as public, or if the requester is a friend of the owner.
In any other situation, the request would be rejected. (RB3)
In the following section, we describe how the data schema, pos-
sible requests of a vault such as the one informally presented above
are modelled in Vaultage, and how, from the model of a data vault,
diferent software artefacts can be generated.
4 VAULTAGE
Vaultage is a framework for simplifying the development of data
vault applications, such as Fairnet. It achieves that by (1) provid-
ing core functionalities that are responsible for exchanging en-
crypted messages between peers, (2) generating application-speciic
strongly-typed wrappers of the core functionalities, and (3) generat-
ing skeleton code for application-speciic functionalities. This way,
developers can focus on developing the main functionalities of an
application without having to worry about message⁄data exchange
and encryption.
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we presented the two main requirements
for Fairnet to be a vault-based social network. We started by de-
scribing the data schema of the vault, and then we deined the
requests that it can accept. In the following sections, we discuss the
diferent aspects ± data vault representation, network architecture,
encryption, and code generation ± of Vaultage, and how it addresses
these two requirements of the Fairnet application.
4.1 Data Vault Representation
The irst task for developers when using Vaultage involves creating
a model to deine a data vault application. This model contains
both the data schema and request operations accepted by the data
vault (see Section 2). Instead of devising a new modelling language,
Vaultage currently uses Ecore models to deine data vaults. An
Ecore model contains all the relevant aspects to describe the data
schema of a vault (by deining diferent classes), as well as the set
of requests (via operations). As an example, Listing 1 shows the
model of Fairnet in the Emfatic notation2, which has been speciied
based on the information of Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
In the model, the Fairnetvault, Friend and Post classes are deined
(lines 4-13, 15-18 and 20-24). When deining a data vault, one of
the classes of the model has to be deined as the vault class. To
do so, one class has to be marked with the @vault annotation,
indicating that the implementation of that class will be generated
as a vault class (e.g., the FairnetVault class in Listing 1). This
vault class is the one that identiies the data vault inside the code of
the application (e.g. Fairnet in the example). The attributes deined
in the vault class determine the contents stored in the data vault,
i.e., the data schema. Other classes in the model are used as data
containers and to provide domain types that might be used along
the application. In the example, a Fairnet’s data vault, according
2https:⁄⁄www.eclipse.org⁄emfatic⁄
Listing 1: Fairnet’s model.
1 @GenModel(basePackage ="org.vaultage.demo.
fairnet ")
2 package fairnet;
3
4 @vault
5 class FairnetVault {
6 attr String name;
7 val Friend [*] friends;
8 val Post [*] posts;
9
10 op Boolean addFriend(String friendName);
11 op Post getPost(String postId);
12 op String [*] getPosts ();
13 }
14
15 class Friend {
16 attr String name;
17 attr String publicKey;
18 }
19
20 class Post {
21 attr String title;
22 attr String content;
23 attr String timestamp;
24 attr boolean isPublic;
25 }
to the FairnetVault class, stores a name, a list of Friends, and a list
of Posts (lines 4, 5 and 6, respectively). This deinition matches the
data schema requirements of Section 3.1 (RA1, RA2 and RA3).
In addition, the vault class also has to contain the requests that
can be accessed by other vaults. These requests are deined as op-
erations of the vault class. For example, to represent the available
requests in Fairnet, i.e., addFriend, getPosts, and getPost (require-
ments RB1, RB2, and RB3 of Section 3.2), three operations with the
same name are deined inside the FairnetVault class (lines 10, 11
and 12, respectively). The parameters of these operations represent
data included in the requests, and the return value indicates the
type of the response that should be provided for each request. For
instance, an addFriend operation requires a friendName string to
be provided as a way to identify the requester. The result of this
operation is indicated with a boolean value, which will be true if
the friend request is accepted and false if it is rejected.
4.2 Network Architecture
In its simplest form, a data vault application is composed of a set of
users, and each one is the owner of a data vault. The interactions of
a user within the application generate data requests and responses
to be interchanged with data vaults of other users. So, one of the
main requirements for the Vaultage framework is providing a secure
communication mechanism for these data vaults, which we present
in this section.
As data vaults are decentralised, we opted for using a relay
communication system provided by a message broker. Data vaults
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would subscribe to the broker using a public identiier. Then, it is
possible to send requests to a concrete data vault by using their
identiier when sending the request. There are several message
broker applications available, such as Apache Active℧Q3 (the one
currently in use by Vaultage), Kafka4, or ℧osquitto [8].
Figure 1 includes a diagram of the described network, using the
Fairnet example. Each user is subscribed to an Active℧Q queue,
which is used by the message broker to deposit messages coming
from other users5. The igure also shows an example of themessages
that would be interchanged in Fairnet when a friend request is sent
from one user to another. In the example, Alice sends a friend invite
to Bob (step 1). This action in the Fairnet app is translated into an
addFriend request message, including the appropriate parameters
(step 2). In this case, the parameters are the destination of the
message (i.e. the łBobž queue ⁄ data vault), and the name of the user
that sends the friend request (łAlicež). This request is relayed by the
message broker into Bob’s queue, which is received and translated
into a Fairnet friend request in Bob’s app (step 3). Then, in step 4,
Bob accepts the friend invite from Alice. This acceptance is encoded
as an addFriend response message, with łAlicež as the recipient of
the response, and the true value to indicate that Bob has accepted
the friend invite. As before, the message arrives at Alice’s queue
through the broker, and it is translated into a notiication of Bob’s
accepting the initial request.
4.3 Encryption
All request and response messages sent in the architecture pre-
sented in the previous section are secured with asymmetric en-
cryption [15]. The use of encryption is ingrained into the network
coniguration: data vaults subscribe to the message broker with
their public key as their public identiier. For instance, in the ex-
ample of Figure 1, łAlicež and łBobž are the public identiiers used
for communication. In a real context, Alice and Bob’s public keys
would be used.
When a message is sent to another data vault, a double encryption
of the message is performed, in the following order:
(1) The message is encrypted using the private key of the sender.
This allows knowing that a message comes for a certain data
vault, which reduces the possibility of impersonating attacks.
(2) A new encryption is performed, using this time the receiver’s
public key. This is the standard encryption step that seeks
that the contents of the message are only accessible by the
receiver.
When a message is received, the inverse decryption is performed,
i.e., by using the private key of the receiver irst, and then the public
key of the sender.
Currently, Vaultage uses Java’s built-in RSA (key size 2048 bits)
[11] as the algorithm for key-pair generation, and one of the RSA
implementations6 provided by Bouncy Castle7 for ciphering. By
3https:⁄⁄activemq.apache.org⁄
4https:⁄⁄kafka.apache.org⁄
5As a technical side note, we are also considering the use of Active℧Q topics, which
would be beneicial when including support for multiple user devices. https:⁄⁄activemq.
apache.org⁄how-does-a-queue-compare-to-a-topic
6Precisely, the RSA/ECB/OAEPWith-SHA256AndMGF1Padding algorithm
7https:⁄⁄bouncycastle.org⁄
applying the double encryption presented in this section, we satisfy
the encrypted messaging challenge in Section 2 (challenge 4).
4.4 Code Generation
The Vaultage generator takes as input a data vault model in Ecore as
described in Section 4.1. This generator has been implemented using
the Epsilon Generation Language (EGL) [16], and the generation
templates provide code in the Java language.
The generator provides classes for diferent concerns. In the fol-
lowing, we explain these concerns over the class diagram of Figure 2,
which contains the generated classes for the Fairnet Example:
• Vault. The class that plays the role of the vault class con-
tains the attributes deined in the data schema. In the ig-
ure, the vault class is FairnetVault (top right), which has
a name, post and friends properties. The vault class also
has one method for each available data vault request. These
methods are called with the appropriate parameters when a
message containing the associated request is received (e.g.
an addFriend request would trigger a call to the addFriend
method of the FairnetVault class). So, to determine how a
request is handled, developers would only need to include
some code in the associated method. An extra token parame-
ter we have not discussed before appears in the signature of
some methods. This token is used to link responses to their
associated requests, as several requests might be received at
the same time. A FairnetVaultBase parent class is also gen-
erated. This class contains properties and methods required
for Vaultage to work (e.g. the vault’s public and private keys),
which must not be modiied directly by the developers.
• Remote Vault. A class with the same name as the vault
and the Remote preix (e.g. RemoteFairnetVault in the top
left of the igure) is created to provide developers with a
high-level interface to send the requests and responses to
other data vaults. This class requires the remotePublicKey
that will receive the message, and the local vault to prepare
the messages. For each request, a pair of methods is created:
one to send requests, and another one to respond them. As
an example, the getPosts method would be called to send
a request to a remote vault, while the respondToGetPosts
one would be executed by that remote vault to respond to
the request.
• Internal Entities. These are the classes used in the deini-
tion of the data schema of a data vault model. In the example,
the Friend and Post classes would be internal entity ones.
• Response Handlers. These interfaces (bottom left) must
be implemented to provide the code that would be called
when receiving a response to a previously sent request. There
is one interface for each possible data vault request. For in-
stance, the AddFriendResponseHandler runmethod would
be called in step 6 of Figure 1, that is, when Alice receives
Bob’s response regarding her previous friend request.
• Message Handlers. These are auto-generated classes that
manage the broker messages in the background. They are
responsible for calling the appropriate Vault class method
when a request is received, and of invoking the associated
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friend request
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5. addFriend response
("Alice", true)
Figure 1: Network architecture provided by Vaultage
FairnetVault
name : String
addFriend(String requesterPubKey,
    String requestToken, String friendName)
getPosts(String requesterPubKey,
    String requestToken)
getPost(String requesterPubKey,
    String requestToken, String postId)
FairnetVaultBase
Friend
name : String
publicKey : String
 
Post
title : String
content : String
timestamp : String
isPublic : boolean
 
FairnetResponseMessageHandler
process(VaultageMessage message,
    String senderPublicKey, Object vault)
GetPostsResponseHandler
run(FairnetVault me, String otherPubKey,
    String responseToken, List<String> result)
RemoteFairnetVault
remotePublicKey : String
addFriend(String friendName)
respondToAddFriend(boolean result,
    String responseToken)
getPosts()
respondToGetPosts(List<String> result,
    String responseToken
getPost(String postId)
respondToGetPost(Post post,
    String responseToken)
FairnetBroker
BROKER_PORT : String
start()
stop()
AddFriendResponseHandler
run(FairnetVault me, String otherPubKey,
    String responseToken, boolean result)
GetPostResponseHandler
run(FairnetVault me, String otherPubKey,
    String responseToken, Post result)
FairnetRequestMessageHandler
process(VaultageMessage message,
    String senderPublicKey, Object vault)
friends *posts *
1
localVault
1
1
1
Figure 2: Class diagram of the classes that are automatically
generated by Vaultage for the Fairnet example.
response handler when a response message of a previous
request arrives.
• Broker Server Launcher. This class is responsible for launch-
ing the Apache Active℧Q broker server. It allows certain
modiications, such as coniguring the port in which the
broker server is started.
5 EVALUATION
We describe here our ongoing eforts for the evaluation of the
Vaultage framework. We start by presenting the diferent data vault
applications generated during the development of Vaultage. Then,
we include some initial results of the performance-related experi-
ments we are currently carrying out.
Table 1: Vaultage model length (in lines of code) against the
generated code.
Application ℧odel Lines Generated Code Lines Ratio
Fairnet 23 371 1:16
Pollen 20 332 1:17
Synthesiser 7 202 1:29
5.1 Data Vault Applications Generation
We have created three minimal data vault applications ± Fairnet,
Pollen, and Synthesiser ± to evaluate the code generation capa-
bilities of Vaultage. All these applications can be found online in
Vaultage’s open source repository8. Each application has a speciic
objective that makes them diferent to the others. We also measured
the degree of automation that Vaultage provides by calculating the
ratio between the number of lines in the input model (L℧) and
the number of lines of generated code (LG) for each application.
Table 1 shows the obtained ratios, as well as the absolute line counts.
Comments and empty lines are excluded from these counts. We
expect these ratios to further improve as Vaultage matures and
extra functionality is covered by the automatic generators.
5.1.1 Fairnet. This application, which was the initial example used
to develop Vaultage, was already introduced in Section 3. Although
simple, Fairnet is versatile enough to ofer diferent concerns for
the code generations to care about, such as friendship relationships
between vaults, a mixture of public and private data (e.g. post title
and contents, respectively), and requests that can be automatically
answered (getPost, getPosts) including also others that require user
input (addFriend). This versatility is also useful for presenting Vault-
age, which made us select Fairnet as the running example for this
paper.
5.1.2 Pollen. This application makes use of ℧ulti-Party Computa-
tion techniques (℧PC) [5] to perform polls securely. The application
of ℧PC aims to prevent any participant of the poll to know the
answer of any other participant. For instance, by applying ℧PC to
8https:⁄⁄github.com⁄York-and-℧aastricht-Data-Science-Group⁄vaultage
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Figure 3: Time required to complete Synthesiser runs of in-
creasing work size, using unencrypted/encrypted messages.
perform polls, it is possible to ask a set of participants some ques-
tion (e.g. a 1-to-10 rating about a government decision, a workplace
policy, or a teacher’s performance), while ensuring that any person
participating in the poll cannot know the response of any other
participant, and that the originator of the poll is also only able to
see the inal aggregated responses of all participants. Therefore,
the main beneit provided by Pollen is a non-trivial communication
problem that has been very useful for polishing Vautage’s auto-
generated message handling architecture, so that it becomes easy
to use for data vault application developers.
5.1.3 Synthesiser. This is an internal performance testing tool that
allows evaluating the architecture generated by Vaultage. In this ap-
plication, vaults store no data, and can only respond to an increment
request. This request provides a number as a parameter, and it is
always responded with the following number (i.e. it adds one). Each
node in Synthesiser is denoted as a worker. When created, a worker
receives a number of tasks to perform, each of these consisting in
sending an increment request to another worker of the network.
A worker inishes its work when all tasks have been completed,
i.e., when it has sent and received back the provided number of
tasks to complete. Given a network coniguration that includes
the traic pattern for workers to distribute tasks among them, this
application can be used to measure how much time is required
to complete a certain number of tasks per worker. In addition, by
using the same Synthesiser network coniguration we can compare
the performance of other system aspects, e.g., diferent encryption
mechanisms, ways of handling request or response messages, or
how data is retrieved and stored in a vault.
5.2 Vaultage Performance
We are in the process of stress-testing the auto-generated network
architecture, as well as proiling the time spent in the diferent as-
pects of the communication process, such as encryption or message
handling.
Related to proiling Vaultage communication, Figure 3 shows
some preliminary results on the weight that encrypting transmitted
messages has in the total time required for a Synthesiser run to
complete. We ran these tests in isolation using a desktop computer
with an Intel i5-6400 4-core⁄4-thread CPU, with 24GiB RA℧ run-
ning at 3200℧Hz, and a SATA SSD drive. In the measurements, we
used three Synthesiser workers, leaving an extra core for running
the associated Active℧Q broker. We performed several Synthesiser
runs of increasing work size, ranging from 25 tasks (i.e. requests
sent) per worker to up to 200. To ensure our measurements were
trustable, each Synthesiser run was run several times per work size,
and then 95% conidence intervals for the times of each work size
were calculated and depicted in the bar chart of Figure 3. Based on
the values of these intervals, the measurements were stable across
all work sizes. The results show that, on average, encryption⁄de-
cryption of messages imposes a 37% penalty over the time required
to complete a Synthesiser run without message encryption. This
kind of tests could also be useful to compare diferent encryption ap-
proaches, e.g., measuring the cost of using greater RSA encryption
key lengths.
Although we consider performing the previous tests locally is a
good way to measure the encryption penalty on the transmission
without being afected by the reliability of a network, we are also
interested in running them in a more realistic scenario, i.e., using
distributed nodes in a controlled network, or in a cloud service such
as AWS or Google Cloud. Such network conigurations would also
be more adequate to test other issues, such as increasing the number
of on-the-ly messages to stress-test the central broker, as well as
the data vault nodes. We would also like to compare the efect of
relaying many long messages (e.g. transmitting media content such
as images or video) through the broker with establishing point-to-
point communications between nodes that want to share heavy
amounts of data.
6 RELATED WORK
One of the irst approaches for online service providers to lend
control of users data is to store it encrypted, in such a way that
these providers cannot decrypt the data themselves. The number of
applications following this approach is increasing, including instant
messaging platforms such as Signal9 or email service providers like
Tutanota10. ℧oreover, some advanced cryptographic techniques
allow doing some privacy-preserving work over encrypted data,
without requiring or knowing how to decrypt it. For instance, Ho-
momorphic Encryption [14] can be used to perform some data
analysis processes over user-encrypted data without the need to
know the encryption key, which might help maintain user data
privacy. Solutions based in this encryption technique have been
applied, among others, to recommender systems [3] and medical
data [19]. Still, and despite the encryption, some users might be re-
luctant to lend service providers the control of their data, in which
case any approach allowing users to store data in self-managed
systems would be a better option.
Providing users with full control of which personal data they
want to share with a third party is a service currently ofered by
several applications. A good example of these is Solid11, which
is based on the storage of users data in personally-managed pods
(somewhat equivalent to Vaultage’s vaults). Any third-party appli-
cation made interoperable with Solid can request access to pods,
and the only ones who can grant this access are the pods owners (i.e.
the users). Solid does not impose any restrictions for the location
9https:⁄⁄www.signal.org⁄
10https:⁄⁄tutanota.com⁄
11https:⁄⁄inrupt.com⁄solid
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where pods are stored, so it allows avoiding centralised backends
and opens the possibility for users to store their data locally.We plan
to study potential beneits of supporting some Solid components
in Vaultage, such as its user authentication infrastructure. Applica-
tions following similar approaches are Digi.me12, CozyCloud13, or
CloudLocker14, among others.
Related to communication aspects, there are several model-driven
approaches that aim to ease the deinition of network conigura-
tions. These approaches focus mostly on information low and
access control [1, 4, 13], which are general concerns of any kind of
network infrastructure. However, less eforts have been put into
the automatic generation of secure network communication capa-
bilities provided by Vaultage. We have only found one application
aiming to generate this kind of communication-related code, in
the context of Internet of Things systems. These systems are com-
posed of (generally) low-power sensor and actuator devices that
interchange data in a distributed network to provide some function-
alities, such as controlling the air-conditioning system of a smart
home installation. The CyprIoT framework [2] allows to deine the
communication of these systems by means of two domain-speciic
languages for the speciication of the network coniguration and
the network policies that must be enforced, respectively. From
these speciications, a model-to-text transformation step can be per-
formed to generate the network code to deploy in the IoT devices
of the system, freeing engineers from dealing with some low-level
details. While Vaultage does not ofer a way to specify ine-grained
network constraints, it is a general-purpose framework that also
supports solid encryption mechanisms for the communication be-
tween more complex nodes than the usual IoT devices. We will
analyse if enabling some network policy conigurations in Vaultage
could be useful for some objectives, such as preventing malicious
behaviours (e.g. denegation of service attacks).
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have presented Vaultage, a framework that is in-
tended to support developers when creating data vault applications.
Vaultage ofers automatic code generation of decentralised data
vault networks, including brokered messaging between vaults, and
securing messages through double encryption mechanisms. Vault-
age has been used to generate three diferent data vault applications:
Fairnet (a social network), Pollen (a polling⁄survey application), and
Synthesiser (for network performance testing).
For our future work, we plan to add more features such as direct
messaging and synchronisation between user devices. Direct mes-
saging will improve the eiciency of data exchange when two vaults
reside in the same network, or when we want to avoid overwhelm-
ing the message broker relay capacity with heavy communications
(e.g. media interchange). Synchronisation between devices will en-
able users to maintain copies of their vaults over multiple devices
for improved availability and fault-tolerance.
12https:⁄⁄digi.me⁄
13https:⁄⁄cozy.io⁄en⁄
14https:⁄⁄www.cloudlocker.eu⁄en⁄index.html
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